The Astros’ batters are not patient, reliever Tayler Scott made changes this season, and a note on losing core players
Today I will skip from topic to topic—but it’s all Astros-related. It’s a few brief notes that I find interesting, and hopefully yuu will too.
Astros’ batters don’t see many pitches. Is that bad?
Judging from TCB game threads, Astros fans complain that their team’s batters are too impatient. The criticism is that they are swing-happy and don’t take enough pitches.
And there is certainly evidence that the Astros’ hitters as a group don’t see many pitches in their at bats. Astros’ batters see the fewest pitches per plate appearance of any team, according to Baseball-Reference stats. The Astros average 3.64 pitches per plate appearance, which is dead last in the major leagues. The Miami Marlins and the Washington Nationals are the nearest teams to the Astros in P/PA. This is not a new development. In 2023, the Astros were in the bottom five of P/PA and in 2022, the Astros were dead last in P/PA.
But does seeing fewer pitches make them a worse offense? This is a more complicated question.
For 2024 data, I compared team pitches per PA with team OPS+. Simply put, team offensive production, as measured by OPS+, is not correlated with team pitches per PA. The correlation is less than 1% and the R-Squared is around 0.08. So basically there is no correlation to support a cause and effect between patience and offensive production.
I still tend to believe that patience is generally a positive hitting attribute, but I suspect it’s more complicated than how many pitches the batter takes. For one thing, a poor hitting team will still produce weak results even if it tries to be patient. As evidence for that statement: the Seattle Mariners are the No. 1 team in pitches per plate appearance (4.02). More granular data such as chase rate that accompanies the hitter’s number of pitches seen may help explain whether the P/PA reflects good or bad hitting characteristics. I previously raised a concern that the Astros’ batters had the third highest chase rate in the majors. I’m pretty sure this is a negative attribute.
In the end, positive results and quality at bats are likely to reflect how well the batter waits for the pitches he is best capable of driving. Presumably seeing more pitches may improve the chances that the hitter will see the best pitch to hit. But there also may be occasions when the hitter expects hittable pitches on the first pitch or early in the count, and the batter decides to use a strategy that on the surface appears to be less patient. As I said, it’s complicated, and we have to hope that the batter has a good game plan when he goes to the plate.
Tayler Scott: Journeyman Reliever Turned Ace Reliever
Taylor Scott is one of the success stories of the Astros’ pitcher development. In 2019 – 2023, Scott pitched for several teams, with an x-ERA between 4.37 and 7.36 and an actual ERA considerably higher than that. In his first season with the Astros, Scott’s x-ERA is 2.36 and his actual ERA is 1.86.
Taylor Scott was recently interviewed by Fangraphs’ David Laurila about how he has changed his performance in 2024. His comments read like a case study in how the Astros try to improve the performance of newly acquired pitchers.
The Astros suggested that Scott should reduce his reliance on sinkers and instead feature his 4 seam fastball high in the strike zone. According to Scott, the Astros told him his 4-seam fastball is his best pitch. Scott said his 2 seam fastball from his arm slot is too predictable for batters.
Tayler Scott has reversed his usage percentages of the 4-seam fastball and the sinker. For example, in 2019 he threw 49% sinkers and 8% fastballs. In 2024 he has thrown 48% 4-seam fastballs and 8% sinkers. If this sounds familiar, this is the same type of advice that the Astros gave Colin McHugh and Garrett Cole—which led to significant changes in those pitchers’ careers. Scott said he has learned about vertical approach angle and induced vertical break on those fastballs at the top of the zone.
The analytic numbers don’t indicate that Scott has a lot of ride on his fastball, but combining the low arm slot with a high fastball creates the visual appearance of a rising 4 seamer—and that brings swing and miss with it. In the FG article, Scott states:
It’s a four-seamer that’s moving like a sinker would, but because of the angle it’s perceived visually to be moving differently than it actually is. It’s one of those things where it’s hard to justify whether a four-seam is good or bad just from looking at it on paper. All that really matters is what the hitter sees, how it is perceived by the hitter.”
Scott also says he has developed a split finger pitch, which he regards as his second best pitch, followed by the slider.
Another important concept for Scott is focusing on “good misses.” By that he means targeting the fastball at the top or above the top of the strike zone, so that any “misses” do not drift downward into the strike zone. If the pitcher worries too much about making sure the pitch lands in the strike zone, the misses turn into hittable meatballs.
Taylor Scott has been used a lot by the Astros this year, and it’s possible he may face some regression going forward this season. In large part that’s because it is difficult to sustain a sub-2 ERA. However, his x-ERA, FIP, and x-FIP are still reasonably good (high 3’s), and potential regression doesn’t mean the results will be weak.
“Critical Mass” for the Astros’ Offense
I sometimes refer to the critical mass of the Astros’ batting order. Critical mass describes the number of elite hitters in the lineup who are necessary to produce a high ranked offense. Yordan Alvarez and Kyle Tucker are clearly in the elite category. Jose Altuve and Alex Bregman are in a tier only slightly behind those two batters. The injury to Kyle Tucker has significantly reduced the critical mass for the offense. The loss of Tucker has been offset to some extent by exceptional performance from Yainer Diaz. Diaz has come on strongly in recent weeks, perhaps indicating that he belongs is a similar tier of hitter as Altuve and Bregman.
When Bregman was out of the lineup with elbow inflammation this week, the critical mass dwindled even more. The Astros are fortunate to have these high quality hitters, but the flip side of this fortune is that Astros’ offense is hurt more when it loses one or more core players.
Before the season started, Fangraphs published an article, “A New Way of Looking At Depth.” The article used the Fangraphs playoff odds model to estimate how much teams are hurt by losing a particular number of their top players.
In general, the Braves, Dodgers, and Astros have the most to lose because so much of their strength is concentrated in elite players. Some above-.500 teams have few elite players but are better able to weather the loss of individual starters because they have capable replacements closer in quality to the players who are removed from the roster.
If the best player is removed from each team, the Astros and Braves projected Win % declines by 26 and 31 points respectively, compared to 19 points for the Dodgers. If three top stars are removed from the roster, the article concludes that the Astros and Braves by far are hurt the most. In that scenario, the Astros’ projected Win % declined below .500 to .495.
In Sunday’s game, the Astros’ lineup was without both Bregman and Alvarez, in addition to Kyle Tucker. In effect, the Astros projected Win% declined from .560 to .495, based on the pre-season simulation in that article. However, the Astros were playing the Chicago White Sox which has a significantly worse Win% than the diminished Astros’ lineup. The result was a win over the White Sox.
I suppose the most obvious conclusion is that the Astros really need Kyle Tucker to return to the lineup and restore that critical mass to the offense. Moreover, unavoidable injuries or rest days for other members of the core lineup would further reduce the Astros’ margin for error.