How do they compare to a now former Astros third basemen?
One of the more interesting facets of baseball history is when we see a glut of good players at specific positions during certain periods of history. This always creates a bit of a conundrum for voters and baseball historians alike. On the one hand, players should be measured against a Hall of Fame standard. That folly acknowledges that there will be periods where there are no worthy players and periods where there will be a number of worthy players.
On the other hand, there is a school of thought that a Hall of Famer should be head and shoulders above the rest. So, by sheer definition, if there are a number of different comparable players then perhaps none of them are truly worthy of the honor. The 1970s and 1980s saw an overlap of a number of Hall of Fame third basemen. Mike Schmidt, Brooks Robinson, Wade Boggs, and George Brett all came from that general time period. So, adding in any of these guys may feel like gilding the lily. After all, if you elect six or seven guys from a time period then how elite are any of them really?
I do go into this in detail in the books. There are just certain periods where there are more dominant players at certain positions. For instance, a deep dive of the catchers shows how many came from the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, that same time period probably had fewer guys from other positions. It’s just how the time period breaks down and we can see that even now with some positions.
We are clumping third basemen in my their general era because that is how they are viewed by most voters. It should be noted that this may not be the most efficient way to do this in terms of the index. However, for most casual fans, this is the they would break down the 1970s and 1980s for those on the outside looking in.
There are advantages to doing this within an article format and advantages to doing it in a book format. On the book side, it is much easier to build a case over a longer period of time. In articles, a lot of this depends on whether you have read past articles. One of the things we have discussed in the past is the fact that voters have generally overestimated the career prowess of third basemen. This can be seen in the numbers produced by the Hall of Fame median.
I have a number of problems with counting numbers. For one, it leaves out key information we will get to shortly. More importantly, it does not highlight how those numbers were achieved. We don’t know where they were achieved and we don’t know how long it took to achieve them. Both of those factors matter.
However, let’s get to missing numbers. A focus on the batting averages for Nettles and Evans misses a lot. Evans had over 1600 walks in his career, so if you add those to his hits you get a much clearer picture of who he was as a hitter. Nettles had nearly 1100 walks in his career. Those two numbers specifically paint each guy in a different light, but also help separate the two even though they have identical .248 career batting averages.
This is why we put a majority of the weight on all of the other tests. Each of those tests helps paint a clearer picture of who the player actually was. Of course, we start with the index and move from there. Sometimes, we will see some separation off the bat that could help us prioritize players we should push forward through the process.
It’s at this point that I must remind the audience of two very important points. First, the index was never meant to rank order players. Nettles is not necessarily better than Bell, Evans, or Cey. It is meant to measure fitness for the Hall of Fame. It acts as a kind of similarity score. Who is he most similar to and do we find that THOSE players are typically Hall of Famers?
The fact that we see some separation between Nettles and the other three is a clue. The second point is that while we are searching for the best player not in the Hall of Fame, that doesn’t mean that player is necessarily a Hall of Famer. By sheer definition, there will always be a best player not in the Hall of Fame. The fact that none of these guys reach the median could be seen as a vote against them, but that ignores the definition of median. Again, there will be as many HOFers below that mark as above.
In all four cases, the idea is to determine how close they come to the Hall of Fame median across the board. That includes offense, fielding, and the awards voting as well. If we still aren’t sure then playoff performance can play a role as well. It is only after we have looked at all of these that we can have a better idea.
The use of WAR by itself to make any of these decisions is essentially a circular argument. His WAR comes up short, so he isn’t a Hall of Famer. Why isn’t he a Hall of Famer? He isn’t a Hall of Famer because his WAR comes up short. Even when we break it down by career versus peak value we are still caught in the same circle. The offensive, fielding, and awards categories help answer the question of WHY a player’s WAR comes up short.
The top three players all enjoyed very long careers and their WAR numbers show that. The offensive numbers above show that all three were just a shade below the Hall of Fame median offensively. So, instead of saying their WAR was too low, we can say they just didn’t dominate enough offensively. That is more specific and meaningful for most fans.
Cey is practically there with the median, so the answer for him is different. He probably just needed one or two more productive seasons to get him over the hump. We also have not seen where he stands defensively. Then again, he has appeared in past articles, so some of you may remember where he stands. It’s a stark comparison with the others.
Some of you may remember me comparing Alex Bregman with Ron Cey. Ironically, they are very similar when you look at the offensive and fielding numbers. In fact, if you look at just the percentage stats, they are similar in postseason production as well. This is where similarity scores come into play. Most Houston fans feel a certain way about Bregman. They don’t have many feelings towards Cey at all. They can look at Cey’s career dispassionately. Bregman is harder to look at through that lens.
Ultimately, Matt Chapman will be harder for people in the Bay Area as well. I’d surmise that he will end up being closer to Nettles and Bell. So, how you feel about those guys can inform how you should feel about Chapman. Naturally, I will be looking at modern third basemen in another article, but the concept is the same for these guys as well.
I should mention that Evans spent a good portion of his career at first base. I’d submit this is because his teams either didn’t realize who they had at third or had someone they deemed better and Evans was willing to move. We will see this as Bregman likely shifts to second so an inferior fielder can play third. Sometimes it is about keeping the peace. Sometimes it is just sheer idiocy. You decide which is which.
Nettles and Bell obviously outpace the median by a considerable margin across the board. That makes their candidacies a bit harder to parse. A run saved is as valuable as a run created. I could see a definite argument for electing them based on their fielding prowess. You could argue it offsets the offense and you wouldn’t be wrong. Qualitatively, Bell has six Gold Gloves to his name while Nettles has two. Still, you can see the numbers above as clearly as I can. They closer defensively than the Gold Gloves would warrant.
I love the MVP points test for two reasons. First, it helps put the peak value into context. Sometimes guys were merely good for ten years (like say Evans) and sometimes they may have had five or six brilliant seasons, but couldn’t sustain it over the full ten (like say Nettles). This context matters as I’m sure most people are more captivated by greatness than consistent solid play.
The second thing we notice is a numerical representation of why certain players get the shaft. All four players were better than what the BBWAA thought they were. Much of that comes down to fielding and its placement within value overall. It isn’t a coincidence that the bigger gaps come with the players that were the best fielders.
Evans is really the only guy that doesn’t come close in BWAR points to the median. Again, no single test should put a guy over the top or torpedo him necessarily, but this is definitely a point against him. He was constantly good, but was rarely ever great. The other three come much closer to the level we customarily see in the Hall of Fame and that might be a point in their favor.
When we are thinking multi-dimensionally we can begin to look at two different tests and reach a new understanding. Bell didn’t play in the postseason. The Indians and Rangers generally sucked as organizations when he played. That knowledge obviously would impact his counting statistics. Runs and RBI are opportunity stats. Someone has to be on base to drive in or at the plate good enough to drive you in. Players on good teams have more of those opportunities.
The trouble with playoff performance is we have to first focus on the opportunity. Some players just didn’t have as many and that can’t be even mostly their fault. Then, we get the question of team performance versus individual performance. Nettles has more rings than Cey. Yet, Cey has better postseason numbers than Nettles. Which matters more at the end of the day?
The answer might seem simple but it really isn’t. Fame is a fleeting thing. There can be no doubt that players that played for dynasties have a distinct advantage in Hall of Fame voting. We could write that off as a bias, but maybe there is something more than meets the eye. The Hall of Fame is a museum that tells the history of the game. Those that participate in those dynasties have a bigger part in history than those that played on middling teams. The Yankees of the late 1970s were more successful than the Dodgers from that same era once they got into the playoffs. Maybe that is enough to overcome numbers that personally are not quite as good.