Can the Astros treat hitters the same way they treat pitchers?
The story of the Astros 2024 season will likely come down to the extra pieces they have recruited along the way. The roster has remained in a state of flux all season as the club has dealt with injuries, ineffectiveness, and everything in between. This has been largely successful on the pitching side of things.
We could do a deep statistical dive as I’m sure they have, but if we simply look at ERAs before and after joining the staff the results are as plain as day. There have been five or six guys between the rotation and bullpen that have either had a career renaissance or emerged for the first time due to the way this club handles pitchers. There is a secret sauce there and we have too many examples now to discount it.
That raises an obvious question. Is it possible for the Astros decision scientists and hitting coaches to do the same thing? For much of the season that has not been the case. So, is this a failing of those departments or is the nature of hitting simply different? I’m certainly not a decision scientist. I have access to the same data you do. However, this is where a critical history is important to note.
The Hollywood version of “Moneyball” glossed over a few details that were in the book. It made things seem like it was all about on base percentage. OBP is certainly important, but that wasn’t really the point of the book. The overall point is that a patient approach (for instance) cannot be taught. It is something a player comes with automatically.
If that is the case then you scout players that have that trait. This turned over 100 years of scouting on its ear. Beyond the simple five tools there was a sixth tool that had to be considered. I might call that tool plate discipline. Others would call it patience or something else. The hit tool measures whether you can actually put the bat on what you swing at. That plate discipline tool is about what you choose to swing at.
Hitting is a reactionary skill. A pitcher can easily change what he throws or focus on hitting different parts of the plate. A hitter has to react to what is pitched. So, asking a hitter to change his instincts is a lot harder than it sounds. Some are able to refine it over time, but hitters are mostly who they are. Jose Altuve has drawn more walks as his career has gone on, but much of that could be attributed to pitchers pitching to him differently.
So, if this supposition follows then general managers and decision makers have to consider what they want their lineup to look like before they form it. What kinds of hitters do they want? Those A’s teams wanted a lineup full of patient hitters that would work counts. However, those lineups have their pitfalls as well. Patient hitters have more two strike counts and therefore strike out more often as a result.
In this regard, three numbers matter. Strikeout and walk rates matter, but Fangraphs also tracks something they call “OSwing”. We will call that a hitter’s chase rate. The over/under on strikeouts tends to be 20 percent. The over/under on walk rate tends to be seven or eight percent. The water level on chase rate is usually 30 percent. That is the percentage of pitches outside of the strike zone that a hitter swings at.
Jose Altuve: 17.8% K Rate, 6.6% BB Rate, 37.9% chase rate
Alex Bregman: 13.4% K Rate, 6.8% BB Rate, 22.0% chase rate
Yordan Alvarez: 14.7% K Rate, 11.2% BB Rate, 31.5% chase rate
Yainer Diaz: 16.1% K Rate, 3.8% BB Rate, 41.8% chase rate
Jeremy Pena: 17.2% K Rate, 3.9% BB Rate, 36.4% chase rate
Jon Singleton: 27.8% K Rate, 11.3% BB Rate, 22.4% chase rate
Jake Meyers: 23.0% K Rate, 6.7% BB Rate, 30.6% chase rate
Mauricio Dubon: 12.8% K Rate, 3.7% BB Rate, 40.8% chase rate
Of course, this is a good news/bad news situation. The good news is that when Singleton is not playing, no one in the Astros has a significantly high strikeout rate. Jake Meyers is a little higher than the league average, but not outrageously so. It shouldn’t be a surprise that the Astros are amongst the league leaders in avoiding strikeouts. Of course, that brings us to the downside.
When Singleton is out of the lineup then Yordan is the only Astro that draws more than the average number of walks. Furthermore, only Alex Bregman is significantly better than average in chase rate. This follows a particular pattern. The Astros put the ball in play and do so early in counts. So, when they are hitting it can look beautiful. When those hits aren’t falling then starting pitchers avoid those high pitch counts.
Getting Kyle Tucker back will help a lot, but the decision scientists landed on Ben Gamel and Jason Heyward. We can look at their career and 2024 numbers to see if the Astros are buying into the Moneyball approach or simply attaching themselves to any port in a storm.
Ben Gamel 2024: 25.5% K Rate, 16.4% BB Rate, 21.3% chase rate
Ben Gamel Career: 24.6% K Rate, 10.3% BB Rate, 24.2% chase rate
Jason Heyward 2024: 18.3% K Rate, 8.3% BB Rate, 31.7% chase rate
Jason Heyward Career: 17.6% K Rate, 10.2% BB Rate, 25.2% chase rate
We see some decay in Heyward’s numbers, but this is a temporary option. Overall this might be a good sign that the decision scientists are back in the driver’s seat here. They have not only picked up two veteran bats that everyone has heard of, but they have picked two guys with the kinds of traits you want in your lineup.
We likely see a platoon between the two when Tucker returns and that also means that Dubon will play less often. On days when Singleton plays first you will have four hitters with above average walk rates and four to five hitters with average to above average chase rates. That’s a much more balanced lineup than what we are currently looking at. Hopefully that means a much more consistent offense. Also, hopefully it will be a model for the offseason when there will be more options available.