A different theory of allocating resources
One thing has always bothered me about the way that the Astros do business. This is a team that has been to the playoffs eight out of the last nine years, won four pennants, and two World Series titles. Obviously, not much should bother us about those results. However, even if you go back to the Drayton McLane days, they have handled negotiations with stars like they are off the books.
It all gets baked into the same payroll. As a mere school teacher, I am not likely to be a billionaire at any point, but if I were and I owned a team my likely strategy would be to tell my general manager what his budget is at the beginning of the offseason and let him build the best roster he can with it. In other words, if I am willing to spend say 25 million a year on Alex Bregman then I should be willing to spend that same amount elsewhere.
Now, obviously we can get into the nuts and bolts about where that money should go. You could extend other guys on your roster to avoid this kind of crunch again. You could spread it around to two or more different guys. You could also sign a similar player (assuming one were available) for a similar amount. This is what economists call opportunity costs.
I am here today to present two such possibilities. Admittedly, these suggestions have major drawbacks. I fully admit this out of the gate. Obviously every move comes with a certain amount of risk. I will likely come back and present different options at another time, so I am not married to any one proposal. I am simply pointing out options.
For every player involved I have included a few pertinent statistics. I will limit those as to not drown you with numbers. What I have done is go back over the last three years. I took the 2024 numbers and multiplied them three times. I multiplied the 2023 numbers twice and then the 2022 numbers once. I did this because obviously the more recent performance is more relevant and that is especially true with aging players. It’s not perfect but hopefully it is a decent fascimile of what we might expect in 2025 at least.
Alex Bregman
2022: 134 OPS+, .358 rOBA, 137 wRC+, 90 total runs
2023: 122 OPS+, .354 rOBA, 126 wRC+, 104 total runs
2024: 118 OPS+, .334 rOBA, 118 wRC+, 86 total runs
Composite: 122 OPS+, .345 rOBA, 124 wRC+, 93 total runs
Total runs takes runs created and adds it to base running runs and defensive runs saved. In general, this is mostly the basis for WAR. We have positional adjustments and adjustments for home ballparks, but it is a general representation. Bregman has been a fairly consistent competitor since 2020. These numbers aren’t spectacular, but they are a general baseline for performance. The estimated contract for him has been in the neighborhood of four years and 120 million. So, let’s consider the 30 million AAV as a benchmark.
Nolan Arenado
2022: 151 OPS+, .381 rOBA, 149 wRC+, 123 total runs
2023: 108 OPS+, .335 rOBA, 106 wRC+, 73 total runs
2022: 101 OPS+, .315 rOBA, 102 wRC+, 75 total runs
Composite: 112 OPS+, .333 rOBA, 111 wRC+, 82 total runs
Arenado is currently under contract and there are rumors the Cardinals want to deal him. He really fell off a cliff after 2022, but he seems to have landed at a position slightly better than league average. He is about a win worse than Bregman in the projections, but that is dependent on home ballparks and more research would need to be done to see how exactly MMP would impact him.
His contract states he is signed through 2027 at a total of 74 million dollars. The Rockies are already paying off ten million of that. Let’s say that the Cardinals could throw in 15 million into the piggy bank and make that essentially 49 million dollars over three seasons. Does Arenado look like a 16 million dollar a year player? Let’s consider what one could do with the savings.
Jon Singleton
Pre 2024: 84 OPS+, .297 rOBA, 88 wRC+, 35 total runs
2024: 103 OPS+, .317 rOBA, 105 wRC+, 39 total runs
Composite: 98 OPS+, .312 rOBA, 101 wRC+, 38 total runs
Singleton is the default solution. He ends up likely signing somewhere near the veteran minimum. At that price you get league average offense overall, but below average offense when compared to most first basemen. You also get piss poor defense and a guy that teams are not comfortable starting against lefties. That helps explain why the total runs are so low. He is essentially a part-time player, so you would be left to scramble for another first baseman on those days.
Paul Goldschmidt
2022: 177 OPS+, .427 rOBA, 175 wRC+, 141 total runs
2023: 120 OPS+, .355 rOBA, 122 wRC+, 106 total runs
2024: 98 OPS+, .326 rOBA, 100 wRC+, 72 total runs
Composite: 119 OPS+, .353 rOBA, 120 wRC+, 95 total runs
I’ll stop you before you send in the hate mail. I don’t trust the composite projection any further then I could throw my car. I think the 2024 numbers are basically who you have as a player. Any contract with a player like Goldschmidt would be a one year deal for a fairly low amount. It might be somewhere between five and ten million dollars. Let’s assume the high end and show everyone what we are talking about here.
I’ll go with the projections for Singleton and Bregman and compare that with the 2024 numbers for Arenado and Goldschmidt just in terms of total runs. For Bregman and Singleton that ends up being 131 total runs. That’s not terrible considering you would add someone and their production against lefties. Goldschmidt and Arenado would be worth 147 runs and that is assuming they play exactly like they played in 2024 and get absolutely no benefit from moving to a better team and possibly a better home stadium for them. However, if Goldy is not your cup of tea…
Carlos Santana
2022: 100 OPS+, .308 rOBA, 102 wRC+, 58 total runs
2023: 101 OPS+, .331 rOBA, 100 wRC+, 88 total runs
2024: 109 OPS+, .329 rOBA, 114 wRC+, 81 total runs
Composite: 105 OPS+, .321 rOBA, 107 wRC+, 80 total runs
Santana made a little more than five million for the Twins this past season. So, I am assuming he would be in the same five to ten million dollar zone as we might project for Goldschmidt. The differences are two-fold, while he is older than Goldschmidt, he has been a lot more consistent. Secondly, he is by far the best defender of the three first basemen in this article and a lack of an ability to pick throws at first might be one of the underrated reason for an increase in errors from your infielders.
Santana and Arenado would combine for over 150 total runs which is two wins better than Bregman and Singleton. Again, it comes with risk. He might turn into a pumpkin (or an Abreu) just like Goldschmidt might. However, with a one year contract it is a relatively minimal investment.
Confidence in Plan B
Plan A is simply to re-sign Bregman and that comes with a number of built in advantages. The number one advantage is familiarity. He is a fixture on the team and he would likely either retire as an Astro or spend most of his career here. He is not a shoo in for the Hall of Fame (I will outline his HOF index position in another piece) but he has an outside shot at it in the very least.
Plan B has some advantages. Both Arenado and Goldschmidt are Hall of Fame players. I don’t have the space to go through it here, but they are pretty locked up there. Maybe they have one or two more magical seasons left in them. Arenado will be 34 and Goldschmidt 36. Combined they would improve the Astros by about a win and come in at a cheaper price than the 30 million earmarked for Bregman. That means you might be able to afford a league average left fielder or depth at center field. I’m not a huge fan of this plan as I suspect most of you are not as well, but it demonstrates that there are options out there.